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Justin Hughes, moderator 
 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review is pleased to publish the third 
“symposium discussion” series in which leading experts are invited to 
engage in an evening symposium on a new or emerging area of law. 
The subject of our second evening symposium was the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), a statute signed into state law by then-
Governor Jerry Brown on June 28, 2018 and effective as of January 1, 
2020. 
As with most new law, there are many unsettled issues, 
disagreements about the likely impact of the law, and much to be 
developed as regulations are established and the law is tested in court. 
To shed some light on the CCPA, the symposium panelists were: 
 • MARGOT KAMINSKI – Margot Kaminski is an Associate 
Professor at the University of Colorado Law School and the 
Director of the Privacy Initiative at Silicon Flatirons. Prior to 
joining Colorado, Margot was an Assistant Professor at the Ohio 
State University Moritz College of Law (2014–2017), and served 
for three years as the Executive Director of the Information 
Society Project at Yale Law School. She received her B.A. from 
Harvard University and her J.D. from Yale. 
 •  JACOB SNOW – Jacob Snow is a Technology and Civil Liberties 
Attorney at the ACLU of Northern California, where he works on 
a variety of issues, including consumer privacy, surveillance, and 
the preservation of free speech online.  Prior to joining the ACLU, 
Mr. Snow was a staff attorney at the Federal Trade Commission.  
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He holds a B.A. in Physics from the University of California at 
Berkeley and a J.D. from Georgetown Law. 
 • FELIX WU – Felix Wu is a Professor of Law at Cardozo Law 
School, Yeshiva University, where he is also Director of the 
Cardozo Data Law Initiative. Professor Wu’s information law 
scholarship spans freedom of speech, privacy law, and 
intellectual property. He received his B.A. in computer science 
summa cum laude from Harvard and both his J.D. and Ph.D. from 
the University of California at Berkeley. 
And our moderator, 
 •  JUSTIN HUGHES – Justin Hughes holds the Hon. William 
Matthew Byrne, Jr. Chair at Loyola Law School, Loyola 
Marymount University.   
 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Good evening, everyone.  On January 1st of this 
year, the California Consumer Privacy Act1 came into effect making 
our state the first in the nation to pass a comprehensive law giving 
each consumer substantial control over the data collected on that 
person, both on the internet and in more traditional business 
transactions. Much has been said comparing California’s new law to 
the General Data Protection Regulation in European Union.2 If you go 
to some websites now, you’re given a choice: if you’re a California 
resident, you can move into one direction for privacy controls and if 
you’re a European Union resident, you can move to another area of 
the site. 
Tonight, we are going to focus on the CCPA itself so that 
everyone has a better understanding of what it does, what questions 
courts are likely to have to address, how businesses are responding to 
the new law, and some of the challenges of making the CCPA 
compatible with First Amendment concerns. We could parse the 
different rights of the CCPA in different ways. I’m going to give you 
 
 1. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (Deering 2020). 
 2. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]; Danielle Kucera, CCPA vs. GDPR: 
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the bumper-sticker version because our panelists will elaborate much 
more on each element of the law. First, there is a right to learn—or 
right of access to—what personal information is being collected about 
the consumer, the sources of the information, the categories of the 
information, the purposes for which the business is collecting them, 
and the specific information. 
I really recommend, if you have not done it, to go to Facebook 
and download all the information that they have about you.3 It’s pretty 
interesting. Second, there is the right to have that personal information 
deleted. And, third, there is the right to opt out of having that personal 
information sold. The CCPA does not apply to businesses below 
certain thresholds, nonprofit organizations, or journalism.4   
Nonetheless, best estimates are that it will affect about half a million 
businesses in California and the result is quite possibly a sea change 
in both privacy rights in the United States and in the global 
information economy. 
To discuss the law with us, we have a distinguished panel. First 
is Professor Margot Kaminski, who is an Associate Professor of Law 
at the University of Colorado Law School where she teaches and 
researches and writes on law and technology. Before joining the 
University of Colorado, Professor Kaminski was on the faculty at 
Ohio State University, clerked for Judge Andrew Kleinfeld of the 
Ninth Circuit, and served as the Executive Director of the Information 
Society Project at Yale Law School. 
Next is Jake Snow, who is a technology and civil liberties 
attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in Northern 
California, and has been at the forefront in the fight for consumer 
protection of privacy. He works on consumer privacy, surveillance, 
and the preservation of free speech online. Before joining the ACLU, 
Mr. Snow was a litigator at the Federal Trade Commission in San 
Francisco focusing on consumer protection. He also clerked for Judge 
Ronald M. Whyte of the Northern District of California. 
Our third panelist is Professor Felix Wu from the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law in New York, where he is also the faculty 
director of the Cardozo Data Law Initiative. Professor Wu writes on 
online intermediary immunity, data de-identification, commercial 
 
 3. How Do I Download a Copy of My Information on Facebook?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/212802592074644 (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 4. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c), (f) (defining “business”). 
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speech protection, and the relationship between privacy and theories 
of free expression. 
Let’s start with Professor Wu, because a key element of this I’d 
like you to explain for us is what personal information is. As I 
understand it, the CCPA has a very broad definition of personal 
information—that it’s anything reasonably capable of being 
associated with or could be reasonably linked to a particular 
consumer.5 Professor Wu, could you start the conversation by talking 
about that? 
FELIX WU: Right. Thank you, Justin. Thanks for having me here 
at this panel. It’s great to be here. It’s great to have this opportunity to 
talk a little bit about the CCPA and its nuances. As described, 
whenever you have a privacy law, one of the key questions is, What’s 
the scope of the law? And one of the key questions for determining 
the scope of the law is, What is the concept of personal information 
that the law will cover? I want to make four points briefly in the time 
that I have here. 
The first is that the definition of personal information under the 
CCPA is indeed quite broad,6 broader than what you tend to see in 
other privacy laws particularly in the United States.7   Second, there’s 
a reason for this breadth. There are reasons to want to have a pretty 
broad conception of personal information being covered in order to be 
able to address certain kinds of privacy issues that might arise. Third, 
the breadth of this definition combined with the relative breadth of the 
different forms of rights provided under the CCPA can lead to some 
interesting and difficult puzzles when it comes to implementing some 
of the rights that are in the CCPA. Finally, that maybe the California 
Attorney General’s regulations and other ways in which the law is 
being implemented might at least start to ameliorate some of the 
difficulties that I will identify, but perhaps not all of them, and I think 
there is still work to be done. 
First on the breadth of the definition here. It’s quite common to 
see fairly general definitions of what counts as personal information 
 
 5. See id. § 1798.140(o) (defining “personal information”). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (2018); Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002). 
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in many privacy laws.8 It is common to see phrases like: not only 
information that directly identifies some individual, but information 
that is reasonably identifiable and could be reasonably used to identify 
someone.9 That concept of “reasonably identifiable” in the CCPA’s 
definition of personal information is a relatively more common part of 
the definition;10 it’s part of the definition in the CCPA and 
increasingly true even of other statutes that don’t specifically mention 
the concept of “reasonably identifying.” 
I will flag here though that even just the concept of information 
being “reasonably identified” with a particular person hides some 
difficult questions.11 In particular, it potentially hides the question of, 
“reasonably identifiable by whom?” What I mean by that is that, when 
you’re trying to figure out whether it’s reasonably possible to connect 
information to a particular individual, you often have to think about: 
Who are we thinking of as the relevant actor? Who is the one that 
might do this potential linkage or identification? It matters a lot what 
other information that particular actor or individual or entity already 
has, with respect to how reasonably identifiable or reasonably linkable 
some information might be. 
We’ve seen this previously, for example, in the context of a 
different privacy law, the Video Privacy Protection Act,12  where some 
courts have interpreted the concept of reasonably identifiable in the 
context of that law to mean reasonably identifiable by a total 
stranger.13 As a result, courts have held that certain kinds of 
 
 8. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 551(a)(2)(A) (2018) (rather unhelpfully stating that “the term ‘personally identifiable 
information’ does not include any record of aggregate data which does not identify particular 
persons”); GDPR, supra note 2, art. 4, at 33 (“‘personal data’ means any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person”). 
 9. Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining “individually identifiable health information” as 
information “(i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable 
basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual”); GDPR, supra note 2, art. 
4, at 33 (“[A]n identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 10. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (“‘Personal information’ means information that 
identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably 
be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”). 
 11. See Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117, 
1158–59 (2013). 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 2710. 
 13. See, e.g., Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2017); In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
(8) 54.1_KAMINSKI, SNOW, WU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/21  5:58 PM 
162 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:157 
information are not personal information under the law—even if that 
information might actually be identifiable by the person who is, in fact, 
holding that information or to whom the information is going to be 
conveyed.14 
So, it matters whether we’re thinking about reasonably 
identifiable as reasonably identifiable by a complete stranger or 
reasonably identifiable by the particular entities who are holding on to 
data or who might be receiving the data. As I said, though, that’s a 
problem that we’ve addressed at least in some measure before the 
CCPA—maybe not satisfactorily, but at least we have seen it before. 
One of the ways in which the CCPA is unusually broad though is, 
for example, the coverage not just of information that is identifiable 
with respect to an individual but information that’s identifiable with 
respect to a household.15 Moreover, the definition includes not just 
information that identifies a consumer or a household, but also 
information that relates to or describes such a consumer or 
household.16 These concepts are expressed in the alternative, 
suggesting that the definition goes beyond actually identifying an 
individual or a household. There’s some question as to what that 
would mean: What does it mean for information to relate to or describe 
an individual or household even if the information is not necessarily 
identifiable to that individual or household? 
So the CCPA’s definition of personal information is quite broad.  
Why might we want such a broad definition of personal information?  
I think one of the key things that the CCPA was meant to address is 
the problem of profiling. When you look at some of the things that are 
specifically listed as forms of personal information—things like 
collections of commercial transaction activity, collections of web 
browsing activity, and the like17—I think the idea is very much that 
when companies take this information and create a profile of 
 
 14. See Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 985–86 (holding that a Roku device serial number and 
plaintiff's watch history were not personally identifiable information within the meaning of the 
VPPA); In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 281–90, 295 (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that static digital 
identifiers such as IP addresses and cookies were personally identifying information). 
 15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (“‘Personal information’ means information that 
identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably 
be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.” (emphasis added)). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(D)–(F). 
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somebody, even when they don’t specifically attach a name to that 
profile, that is still the sort of activity that raises privacy concerns. 
These kinds of profiling can raise privacy concerns for lots of 
reasons, one of which might be, for example, the possibility that it’s 
used to target individuals or to shape their experiences online even 
when the targeting or shaping is, again, not linked to a particular name. 
We might worry about it also because of the ways in which this creates 
a kind of surveillance of individuals by these larger companies that 
then enables those companies to exploit the power they have over their 
users or that could lead to some sort of chilling effect. 
There are lots of reasons potentially to be worried about profiling. 
If you’re going to worry about profiling, that necessitates a fairly 
broad definition of personal information in order to cover these 
profiles, even when the profiles are not directly linked to traditional 
identifiers like names or addresses or email addresses. Not everyone 
thinks that regulating profiling is the right thing to do, of course,18 but 
it is at least a sensible reason to want to have a broad definition of 
personal information. 
At the same time though, having such a broad definition of 
personal information can get really tricky when you also have a 
number of different kinds of rights and they are all linked to exactly 
the same definition of personal information. I want to flag in particular 
this right to access or right to know. Now, we have had access rights 
in other laws, but often tied to particularly narrow definitions of 
personal information. An example here would be the federal Privacy 
Act,19 which has a weird and oddly narrow concept of personal 
information. It has to be not just personal information of some sort; it 
has to be a “record which is contained in a system of records.”20  That 
 
 18. See Adam Thierer, Relax and Learn to Love Big Data, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Sept. 16, 2013, 12:10 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/ 
09/16/big-data-collection-has-many-benefits-for-internet-users. 
 19. See The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); The Privacy Act of 1974, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974#:~:text=The%20Privacy%20Act%20of 
%201974,of%20records%20by%20federal%20agencies (last visited Oct. 4, 2020) (The Privacy 
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018) establishes standards for the “collection, maintenance, use, 
and dissemination of information about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by 
federal agencies.”). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1) “[e]ach agency that maintains a system of 
records shall . . . upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information 
pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit him and upon his request, a person of 
his own choosing to accompany him, to review the record and have a copy made of all or any 
portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him.” 
 20. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
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is, it has to be information that can be retrieved using the name of the 
person involved in order to be covered under the Privacy Act. 
This leads to weird results when the government ends up 
disclosing information, but you might think of it as actually a fairly 
sensible definition when what you’re getting is an access right to this 
information. This definition means that the government only needs to 
look up stuff that they can actually look up—that is, look up the stuff 
that’s actually tied to your name. But we don’t have that in the CCPA.  
We have one definition of personal information that applies both to 
the right to know (or right to access) as well as the right to opt out and 
the right to delete. There are lots of situations where we want to give 
individuals control over the profiles that are potentially being made 
about them, to be able to opt out of the profiling, say, but it’s much 
harder to figure out what it would mean to give them access to those 
profiles when those profiles are not, in fact, linked to their names. 
Just think about a record that lists a whole bunch of transactions 
in it. That long list of transactions is almost surely personal 
information under the California law, but it is the sort of thing that 
may be difficult to isolate and find and therefore spit back at the person 
who is asking about all of the bits of personal information that the 
company holds about him or her. 
What can we potentially do about this? Now, I think there’s no 
easy answer as to exactly how to address this, but I do want to point 
out at least one part of the Attorney General’s regulations that might 
ameliorate some of these concerns—namely, this idea of when can 
you reasonably verify someone’s access request.21 One of the 
provisions in the Attorney General’s regulations says that if you can’t 
reasonably verify someone’s request, you don’t necessarily need to 
fulfill the request.22 Mostly, this was meant as a security measure 
because personal information, of course, can be highly sensitive. If 
you give it to the wrong person, that’s going to create more problems 
than the ones you were trying to solve in the first place. 
This concept of verifying a request, I think, was largely designed 
with those security concerns in mind, but the draft regulations do say 
 
 21. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.313(c)(1) (2020) (“For requests that seek the 
disclosure of specific pieces of information about the consumer, if a business cannot verify the 
identity of the person making the request pursuant to the regulations set forth in Article 4, the 
business shall not disclose any specific pieces of personal information to the requestor and shall 
inform the requestor that it cannot verify their identity.”). 
 22. Id. 
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that if you can’t reasonably verify a request then that’s a valid ground 
for not fulfilling the request. In a way, some of what I’m describing 
are situations in which it’s arguably not possible to reasonably verify 
a request. How do you know whether a long list of transactions is, in 
fact, this person’s transactions unless you actively go through the list 
trying to figure it out? It would seem like a bad idea to ask companies 
to do that. So maybe this part of the regulations might help. 
I will say, though, that this part of the regulations applies only to 
the access right and not to the opt-out right, which means that it is still 
going to be the case that when an individual opts out of the sale of 
their data, it will be tricky to figure out how a company will find all 
the relevant profiles in order to ensure that they are not, in fact, 
transferred in a sale transaction. I think there will continue to be 
difficult problems with, again, the breadth of the rights combined with 
the breadth of the definition of personal information. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Thank you. Professor Wu has already raised so 
many interesting questions and I should add what I should have said 
in the introduction is that the law is not enforceable until the middle 
of this year and the California Attorney General has been in the 
process of issuing regulations of which there have been two iterations? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yes. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Two iterations. Now, Professor Kaminski, I 
think the regulations are actually shorter than the law itself. Is that 
right? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yeah. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: All right. When we refer to the regulations, we’re 
referring to the draft regulations that are not yet made official, is that 
correct? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yes, the comment period ends the end of this 
month, February 25. 
JAKE SNOW: Yeah. 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: But the reason we’re both reacting is because 
there will probably be retroactive enforcement of the regulations that 
are not in place yet.23 
 
 23. See Chris Mills Rodrigo, Historic California Data Privacy Measure Leaves Companies 
Scrambling, THE HILL (Jan. 1, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/476368-
historic-california-data-privacy-measure-leaves-companies-scrambling. 
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JUSTIN HUGHES: Yes, that’s another bizarre issue. There may be 
retroactive enforcement of regulations that the companies don’t yet 
know. The Act will be effective on July 1, correct? 
JAKE SNOW: The language of the statute is that the Attorney 
General (AG) can’t bring an enforcement action until that date. That 
means the AG can’t actually file a lawsuit to enforce the law until July, 
but the AG has said—and I think if you look at the law, it is the most 
sensible reading of it—that there is a requirement to comply with the 
law as of January 1. But there can’t be an enforcement action filed in 
court until July. Despite what you may have heard, we’re not talking 
about The Purge for privacy until July of 2020.24 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Well, that leads into just the thing I wanted to 
ask you to talk about. What is happening on the ground, Mr. Snow?  
How are businesses reacting? Are best practices emerging? What’s 
happening on the ground in terms of compliance with the law? 
JAKE SNOW: Thanks for the question. It’s really good to be here 
and to talk with all of you. I’ll talk about three areas where 
developments in regulations and enforcement strategies could affect 
your rights as consumers under the CCPA and how you actually can 
exercise those rights. The first one is personal information, and how 
the definition of it operates. I’d like to talk a little bit about a different 
aspect of the concept of personal information than Professor Wu 
talked about. And then second, the opt-out of sale rights and how 
they’re operationalized. 
The scope of personal information is properly broad and it 
includes illustrative examples written into the definition—IP 
addresses, email addresses, postal addresses, things like that.25 The 
definition includes anything that is reasonably capable of being 
associated with a person, and that is because the law takes into account 
the fact that personal information as it is used today can be 
transformed to other kinds of information, and vice versa. A browsing 
history is also a medical record if you’re searching for information 
about a disease that you’re concerned you might have. Location data 
are personal information, but if combined with locations of people 
who you’re spending time with, location information can reveal a 
 
 24. See THE PURGE (Universal Pictures 2013). The central premise of The Purge is a society 
in which all crimes are legal for one twelve-hour period every year. The Purge, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Purge (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)(A) (Deering 2020). 
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record of people’s past associations. And, of course, other kinds of 
personal information can be extracted from your location data as 
well—your interests, your religious affiliations, the identities of your 
coworkers, your political commitments. 
Location information is very difficult to separate from an 
individual’s identity, because as it turns out, most people spend a lot 
of their time at two places—where they work and where they live. 
With location data that have a unique identifier linked to each 
person—even if that person is not otherwise identified—you can just 
see where they go at night, and that’s probably their home. Then you 
can, for example, look at public voter rolls to find their address and 
you may have identified the person. I imagine everyone saw the recent 
New York Times piece that looks at a huge data set26—a set of twelve 
million phones and the location data associated with those phones—
and identifies people in those records. That includes secret service 
agents who were with President Trump.27 According to the article, 
even without the identities, it was child’s play to convert dots on a map 
to specific people.28 
How does this affect the CCPA and the best practices in how it’s 
being implemented? In the legislative session last year, 2019, there 
was a bill that sought to change the definition of personal information 
by creating an exception for what is called “deidentified 
information.”29 Now deidentified information under the CCPA is 
 
 26. Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero 
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/l
ocation-tracking-cell-phone.html. 
 27. Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, How to Track President Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/20/opinion/location-data-national-
security.html. 
 28. Thompson & Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy, supra note 26 
(noting that location data companies, using smartphone location information, “can see the places 
you go every moment of the day, whom you meet with or spend the night with, where you pray, 
whether you visit a methadone clinic, a psychiatrist’s office or a massage parlor”). 
 29. Assemb. B. 873, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“[The] bill would revise the definition 
of ‘deidentified’ to instead mean information that does not identify, and is not reasonably linkable, 
directly or indirectly, to a particular consumer, provided that the business makes no attempt to 
reidentify the information and takes reasonable technical and administrative measures designed to 
ensure that the data is deidentified, publicly commits to maintain and use the data in a deidentified 
form, and contractually prohibits recipients of the data from trying to reidentify [the data].”); see 
also Maria Dinzeo & Nick Cahill, Efforts to Gut Consumer Privacy Act Largely Fail, COURTHOUSE 
NEWS SERV. (July 10, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/efforts-to-gut-consumer-privacy-
act-largely-fail/ (discussing technology companies’ support for Assembly Bill 873); Issie 
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information that can’t be associated with a person according to a strict 
standard.30 So remember those location records The New York Times 
picked people out of? Those would not qualify as “deidentified” under 
the CCPA’s definition.31 The bill would have amended the law so that 
under normal circumstances, an IP address, for example, or device 
identifier, would not qualify as personal information.32 
That bill failed, but language similar to it has come back into the 
draft regulations.33 This is going to be consequential because all of this 
information collected as people browse the internet and move about 
the world doesn’t have people’s names or addresses associated with it.  
But you can both group that information with other information about 
the person without knowing their name and also, with a little work (as 
The New York Times did), find out their name. The problem is that 
there’s a very concerted effort to eliminate people’s rights for 
information like this by carving it out of the definition of personal 
information under the CCPA. If that effort is successful, if you want 
to opt out of that information being sold, you won’t be able to. The 
AG’s regulations with respect to this point will be very consequential 
and, unfortunately, the outcome will be mostly invisible—consumers 
won’t know what they don’t know. 
 
Lapowski, Tech Lobbyists Push to Defang California’s Landmark Privacy Law, WIRED (Apr. 29, 
2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-privacy-law-tech-lobby-bills-weaken/. 
 30. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(h) (CCPA currently defines “deidentified” as 
“information that cannot reasonably identify, relate to, describe, be capable of being associated 
with, or be linked, directly or indirectly, to a particular consumer” and requires the business to 
ensure that the data remain deidentified). 
 31. The location data would not fit the current definition of “deidentified” under CCPA 
because such data are reasonably capable of being associated with a particular person. See id. 
 32. Because under the proposed Assembly Bill 873, information is considered “deidentified” 
when it “does not identify and is not reasonably linkable, directly or indirectly, to a particular 
consumer,” location data and IP addresses would be considered “deidentified” and thus, would be 
excludable from CCPA protections. Assemb. B. 873 (noting that businesses may “[c]ollect, use, 
retain, sell, or disclose [deidentified] consumer information”). 
 33. See Proposed Text of Modified Regulations, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 999.302, at 4 (Feb. 
7, 2020), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-text-of-mod-redline-
020720.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 999.302] (“Whether information is 
‘personal information,’ as that term is defined in Civil Code section 1798.140, subdivision (o), 
depends on whether the business maintains information in a manner that ‘identifies, relates to, 
describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could be reasonably linked, directly 
or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.’ For example, if a business collects the IP 
addresses of visitors to its website but does not link the IP address to any particular consumer or 
household, and could not reasonably link the IP address with a particular consumer or household, 
then the IP address would not be ‘personal information.’”). 
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The second thing I would like to talk about is the possibility of 
opt-out that doesn’t put the burden on people to go through and do all 
the opt-out separately. At the ACLU, we put forth a proposal in the 
California legislature last year called “Privacy for All” that would 
have required instead of an opt-out framework for sale of personal 
information, an opt-in framework for the sharing of personal 
information.34 The reason for that is simple.  If you want to exercise 
your rights under the CCPA to opt out of the sale of your personal 
information, the first thing you have to do is find out who has your 
information and then you have to go through and do the opt-out for 
each one. 
Just think about all websites you’ve ever been to and then all the 
apps on your phone and then all the data brokers that might have your 
information. California just released the first data broker registry, a 
registry with 143 data brokers.35 Add those 143 data brokers to your 
list. If you want the list of all these entities, by the way, you go to 
caprivacy.me or simpleoptout.com.36 They have a long list of 
companies and links to where you can opt out. You can have hundreds 
and hundreds of companies on this list. You have to start at the top or 
you start at the bottom, I guess. You go through all of them and you 
proceed to call them or email them or click the button or fill out the 
forms or find the settings and go through an opt-out of a sale of your 
personal information. 
After a while, you’ll probably conclude that opting out like that 
is a charade designed to exhaust you. And so you’ll give up and go 
back to living your life. 
 
 34. The ACLU proposal was introduced by Assembly Member Buffy Wicks as Assemb. B. 
1760, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). See ACLU Supports New California Bill to Ensure 
Privacy for All, ACLU S. CAL. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/aclu-
supports-new-california-bill-ensure-privacy-all; Hayley Tsukayama, It’s Time for California to 
Guarantee “Privacy for All”, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/02/its-time-california-guarantee-privacy-all. 
 35. As of November 20, 2020, the number of data brokers on California’s registry is over 400. 
Data Broker Registry, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUST, OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
https://www.oag.ca.gov/data-brokers. 
 36. CAL. PRIV. DIRECTORY, https://caprivacy.github.io/caprivacy/full/ (last visited Oct. 4, 
2020) (providing a list of companies that collect information and links to contact them); SIMPLE 
OPT OUT, https://simpleoptout.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2020) (same). See generally Michael 
Hiltzik, Column: Big Business Is Trying to Gut California’s Landmark Privacy Law, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 19, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-cal-privacy-act-
20190419-story.html (presenting a general discussion of political struggle between opt-out and opt-
in in relation to CCPA). 
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The only reasonable way to address this is to have a single, 
device-based global setting which allows you to opt out once and then 
every piece of information that goes on and off your mobile device or 
through your browser is subject to that general opt-out. 
The idea would be a metadata flag of some sort associated with 
that data that opts the data out of being sold.  The important thing about 
that, I think, is that it actually provides an additional solution to the 
problem of all this information being associated with the person, 
which is that if you go to a website and the website is unsure of who 
you are, but you have this opt-out flag set, then the website can 
associate that opt-out flag with all of your interactions with the website 
and then under the law, it can’t sell that information—even if it hasn’t 
the foggiest idea that you are you and that you’re accessing the 
website. 
The AG draft regulations have a requirement that global opt-outs 
in devices or in browsers be respected, and that has been the subject 
of significant discussion in the comments on the draft regulations, but 
the law should retain that requirement.37 If it does, then everyone 
would have the ability to opt out once instead of doing it hundreds and 
hundreds of times and eventually giving up. 
Finally, I would like to talk about the issue of Facebook and what 
Facebook has said about the CCPA and how its business complies 
with the CCPA. Spoiler alert, I don’t think what they’re saying makes 
any sense at all. To explain, the question is how the CCPA treats 
information generated by apps you use or websites you visit which is 
then shared with Facebook. Facebook takes that information about you 
and displays an ad or reports analytics back to the app or website to 
track performance. And we recall that the CCPA allows consumers to 
opt out of the sale of their personal information. The question is 
whether that delivery of information from the app or website to 
Facebook is a sale. In simple terms, is Facebook buying your 
information from that website when that happens? 
Facebook has said that it is not receiving personal information 
pursuant to a sale because it is a service provider under the CCPA.38  
 
 37. See Proposed Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 999.302, supra note 33. 
 38. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(v) (Deering 2020) (“‘Service provider’ means a sole 
proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or other legal entity 
that is organized or operated for the profit or financial benefit of its shareholders or other owners, 
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It is saying, in other words, we are a service provider and we’re 
providing the service to those websites or apps that are sharing 
information with us, and so we’re not a recipient of sold personal 
information. It’s important to note that Facebook is not talking about 
its own conduct; it is saying that its customers—the apps and 
websites—are not violating the CCPA and don’t have to let their users 
or readers opt out of sharing information with Facebook. Facebook 
has less skin in the game here than it might initially appear. Basically, 
the CCPA says that people can instruct businesses not to sell their 
information39 and sale is defined quite broadly40—I think properly 
quite broadly—but it is essentially any sharing of information that is 
accompanied by, or in return for, valuable consideration. You 
probably remember that from contract law class and that concept is 
flexible. It allows this notion of “sale” to capture any circumstance 
where there is the sharing of information and the return of some value. 
There’s an exception to the definition of “sale” and that relates to 
service providers. The kind of quintessential service provider, in my 
view, is a website host or payment processor where that entity is 
providing a limited and discrete service to a business so the business 
can operate. That’s why sharing those entities doesn’t constitute a sale 
from which the consumer can opt out: because the service provider is 
merely enabling the original first party collector to operate, and 
nothing more. 
But there’s an important restriction on how service providers 
operate. If you look at section 140(v) and 140(w)(2),41 the CCPA says, 
 
that processes information on behalf of a business and to which the business discloses a consumer’s 
personal information for a business purpose pursuant to a written contract, provided that the 
contract prohibits the entity receiving the information from retaining, using, or disclosing the 
personal information for any purpose other than for the specific purpose of performing the services 
specified in the contract for the business, or as otherwise permitted by this title, including retaining, 
using, or disclosing the personal information for a commercial purpose other than providing the 
services specified in the contract with the business.”). The CCPA generally imposes obligations on 
“businesses,” not “service providers.” See id. §§ 1798.100–.130. 
 39. Id. § 1798.120(a) (“A consumer shall have the right, at any time, to direct a business that 
sells personal information about the consumer to third parties not to sell the consumer’s personal 
information.”). 
 40. Id. § 1798.140(t)(1) (“‘[S]ale’ . . . means selling, renting, releasing, disclosing, 
disseminating, making available, transferring, or otherwise communicating orally, in writing, or by 
electronic or other means, a consumer's personal information by the business to another business 
or a third party for monetary or other valuable consideration.”). 
 41. See id. § 1798.140(v), (w)(2). 
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in effect, that you can use that information to provide the service, but 
you can’t do a whole bunch of other stuff with it. 
So what does Facebook do? I will just add a proviso here that it 
is not clear from the outside exactly what Facebook does, but this is 
what I’ve surmised based on their public statements and their 
documentation. Apps and websites will often send information about 
your use of the app or the website to Facebook. Often that is so 
Facebook can return targeted advertisements to the app or website, but 
Facebook also provides various other services, like analytics services 
to its customers. To enable that, the app or website developer installs 
a tracker that sends that information back to Facebook. Facebook takes 
that information and provides a service, like returning a targeted ad for 
the individual or integrating that information into an analytics 
platform. But Facebook also takes that information and often 
integrates it into a comprehensive profile of that person, which it then 
further exploits to provide, in Facebook’s terminology, “relevant 
advertisements to the person.”42  That, I think, is the key problem with 
the notion that Facebook is acting solely as a service provider. 
Facebook actually has a tool for you to look at all this 
information. It’s called their “Off-Facebook Activity Tool.”43 Using 
this tool, you can disassociate your off-Facebook activity from your 
Facebook account. When you do that, Facebook says the ads you see 
will be less relevant to you. I think that shows essentially what’s going 
on is that Facebook is using off-Facebook activity—information 
provided by third-party apps and websites—and incorporating it into 
the profiles it maintains of people. Then Facebook uses the enhanced 
profile not just for targeted advertisements for the specific third-party 
app or website, but for all of the other targeted advertisements that 
Facebook provides to other businesses. 
If that is consistent with the CCPA, then what can’t a company 
do under the service provider exception? You can monitor people’s 
 
 42. About Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/ads (last visited Oct. 
4, 2020) (“We take the advertiser’s goal, desired audience and ad to show you ads that we think 
might be relevant to you . . . .”). 
 43. The Best Person to Be in Control of Data Is You, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/off-facebook-activity (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). For criticism of 
Facebook’s tool, see Louise Matsakis, Facebook’s New Privacy Feature Comes with a Loophole, 
WIRED (Aug. 28, 2019, 5:56 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/off-facebook-activity-privacy/; 
Shoshana Wodinsky, Facebook’s ‘Clear History’ Tool Doesn’t Clear Shit, GIZMODO (Jan. 28, 
2020, 3:40 PM), https://gizmodo.com/facebooks-clear-history-tool-doesnt-clear-shit-1841305764. 
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activity in excruciating detail online. You can build profiles based on 
that monitoring and combine that profile with other information that 
you have about the individuals. And then you can monetize all that 
information by selling ads to anyone you want. If that all fits within 
the service provider exception, that’s not the loophole swallowing the 
rule, that’s the loophole swallowing the earth. And I don’t think the 
Attorney General’s office will tolerate that kind of interpretation. I’ll 
stop there. Thanks very much. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Thanks. The wonderful thing about listening to 
Professor Wu and Mr. Snow is you get the difference between 
someone who gets to live an academic life versus someone fighting in 
the trenches. I do want to come back to the problem of sales, but before 
we do, I want to ask Professor Kaminski to take us through some 
different problems related to these CCPA constraints on companies—
what data they can keep, what data they can transfer to others. It 
sounds to me like there is a potential firestorm of First Amendment 
litigation. I’m not a particular believer that corporations need every 
single human right to the full extent of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,44 but that seems to be the spirit of our First 
Amendment jurisprudence at times. Can you talk about how privacy 
law in general—and the CCPA in particular—interact with the First 
Amendment? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yes. Again, thank you so much for having 
me. This is a really impressive panel to get to be a part of and it’s really 
fun to connect with other people from around the country who are 
thinking seriously about these issues. I’m going to go through three 
sections as quickly as possible, but slowly enough that it can be 
transcribed, so that we can all get to the meat of the panel, getting to 
talk to each other. 
The first thing I’m going to provide you all is a quick overview 
of First Amendment doctrine. How many people here have had a First 
Amendment class? Okay. This will be really basic because I can’t give 
you an entire semester’s course in eight minutes. The second thing I’m 
going to do is talk about potential First Amendment challenges to the 
CCPA. And then the third thing is to talk a little bit about where we 
might go from here or what I think is coming down the line. 
 
 44. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. 
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On the first issue—this is your First Amendment refresher for 
those of you who have studied this and the First Amendment overview 
for those who haven’t. There are really two steps in determining 
whether First Amendment protection applies. The first step is to ask 
whether something is speech, which is effectively asking whether a 
particular activity is salient to the First Amendment. This might sound 
really obvious when you’re talking about my sitting here and talking 
to you—that’s clearly speech. But my knocking on the table is clearly 
not speech . . . except when it might be speech.45 There’s been a 
question recently in a number of cases about whether transferring data 
or data processing might be considered salient to the First 
Amendment—that is to say whether data is speech.46 There are some 
nuanced issues with that question. 
The second step is determining whether there is First Amendment 
protection. Just because you determined that something is covered by, 
or salient to, the First Amendment, does not necessarily mean that the 
First Amendment protects it. That is, just because it’s speech doesn’t 
mean it’s protected by the First Amendment. Most of you have heard 
of at least some of the various exceptions to First Amendment 
protection such as the exceptions for child pornography, for incitement 
of violence, or for true threats.47 Most of you have also probably heard 
that the US is very permissive in terms of the kinds of speech it does 
protect, so that hate speech is actually protected under the First 
Amendment unless it falls into one of those pre-existing categories of 
speech that are not protected. 
To determine whether speech is not just covered but protected by 
the First Amendment, courts apply different levels of judicial scrutiny. 
Famously, most things that are considered to be pure speech are 
subject to strict scrutiny which is usually fatal in fact. That means that 
when judges apply strict scrutiny to the regulation or the law, the law 
usually fails. But some subcategories of covered speech, including 
 
 45. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag burning is protected speech 
under First Amendment); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (displaying the United States 
flag upside down with a peace symbol taped thereto was protected speech); United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of draft card was sufficiently expressive to trigger First 
Amendment analysis). 
 46. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 58–60 (2014). 
 47. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (outlining the “true threat” exception to First 
Amendment protection); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (distributing child pornography 
is not protected by the First Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that 
speech can be outlawed if is directed to incite imminent violence or unlawful action). 
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commercial speech, are subject to intermediate scrutiny which is more 
of a balancing test. Commercial speech is usually understood as “I am 
proposing to sell you something”—like an advertisement. The 
government has a lot more leeway to regulate in that space than it does 
when it is regulating, for example, what I’m saying right now on this 
panel. 
As a second part, let’s talk about aspects of recent First 
Amendment doctrine that raise particular problems for data privacy—
I’m going to put these in three categories. One is the problem of what 
I’ve been calling the cat-out-of-the-bag doctrine—and I’ll talk about a 
couple of those cases.48 These cases effectively say once information 
is out there, the government can’t try to control dissemination, but it 
turns out there are many nuances to this doctrine. The second is the 
data-is-speech doctrine: there’s a number of cases that point to the idea 
that the Supreme Court at least is increasingly thinking it might be.49  
The third is the general trend of the First Amendment becoming more 
deregulatory along specific lines.50 
First, I think the most important thing to get across here is the 
parameters of what I’ve been calling the cat-out-of-the-bag doctrine.  
The context for these cases is that the Supreme Court was vastly 
extending its First Amendment jurisprudence at that time, largely in 
response to cases that were brought by newspapers. These two 
Supreme Court cases from the 1970s and 1980s, Cox v. Cohn51 and 
Florida Star v. B.J.F,52 both addressed what are known as “rape 
shield” laws. There are laws in different states that say you can’t, as a 
newspaper, print the name of a rape victim. In reviewing challenges to 
these laws, the Court arrived at the principle that once the government 
itself has let the cat out of the bag, that has made the name public either 
 
 48. Margot E. Kaminski & Scott Skinner-Thompson, Free Speech Isn’t a Free Pass for 
Privacy Violations, SLATE (Mar. 9, 2020, 2:53 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/03/free-
speech-privacy-clearview-ai-maine-isps.html; see also United States v. Suppressed, No. 16MC261, 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36565, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2019) (“As the Tribune puts it in a collection 
of mixed metaphors, post-publication ‘the genie is out of the bottle,’ ‘the cat is out of the bag,’ and 
‘the ball game is over.’”); Eugene Volokh, “Once the Cat Is Out of the Bag, the Ball Game Is 
Over.”, REASON (July 13, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://reason.com/2019/07/13/once-the-cat-is-out-of-
the-bag-the-ball-game-is-over/ (discussing the court’s mixed metaphor language in United States 
v. Suppressed). 
 49. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 50. See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Introduction: The Search for an 
Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2018). 
 51. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 52. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
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in a court proceeding or a police report, it cannot go and tell 
newspapers not to print that information. 
First of all, that principle is incredibly problematic for data 
privacy laws like the CCPA. CCPA covers a vast amount of personal 
information, but a lot of that information can be obtained publicly. 
Some of that stuff you can obtain publicly from a government record, 
so putting restrictions on its distribution can potentially raise problems 
within this doctrine. 
My pushback to such reasoning is that the actual test that comes 
out of the rape shield cases is far more nuanced than a general cat-out-
of-the-bag principle. Under those cases, for a government restriction 
on information to be unconstitutional, the information must be 
lawfully obtained and it has to be truthful.53 It also has to be a matter 
of public concern to be covered by the holdings in those cases,54 and 
arguably private information is not usually a matter of public concern.  
And, after all that, the state can still regulate under those cases if the 
state has an interest of the highest order.55 This question of the 
magnitude of state interest in regulating ties into whether we recognize 
privacy harms to be important—more on that later. 
The second aspect of First Amendment doctrine that raises a 
major hurdle for the CCPA is the question of whether “data is speech.”   
In Sorrell,56 the Supreme Court evaluated a Vermont privacy law, 
looked at some of the restrictions, said they were content-based (or 
even overtly speaker-based or viewpoint-based), applied something 
like strict scrutiny and found the law unconstitutional.57 This suggests 
that data and data privacy laws are being seen by the Supreme Court 
as being close enough to First Amendment speech that they will apply 
some sort of scrutiny to these legal restrictions. Professor Wu can push 
 
 53. Id. at 533. 
 54. Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 492 (state could not criminalize the publication of a rape 
victim’s name taken from public records because “[t]he commission of crime, prosecutions 
resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions . . . are, without question 
events of legitimate concern to the public”). 
 55. Id. at 496 (while holding that “[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court 
documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it,” the Court 
also found that government could shield information “by means which avoid public documentation 
or other exposure of private information”). 
 56. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 57. Id. at 580. 
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back on this later—there is a long conversation between the two of us 
on this. 
Last, the general contours of the First Amendment have been 
increasingly deregulatory in ways that are problematic for all kinds of 
consumer protection law, not just data privacy. Because data privacy 
is a form of consumer protection law, this trend is definitely a 
particular concern. We have a number of cases recently in which the 
Supreme Court has said that it is not going to add new categories to its 
categories of unprotected speech58—which suggests that if what’s 
being regulated by the CCPA is found to be speech, we’re in trouble, 
since there’s no explicit First Amendment exception for data privacy 
laws. 
The second is that, content-based and speaker-based distinctions 
which trigger strict scrutiny have been expanding.59 It used to be that 
something called the “secondary effects” doctrine, from a case called 
Renton v. Playtime Theatre (1986),60 allowed courts to say just 
because a law names particular speech (such as pornography) doesn’t 
mean the law is actually targeting particular content of information.  
That is, a state might be permissibly regulating not the speech itself 
but the secondary effects of that information, like what porn theaters 
do to a neighborhood. But this doctrine has recently been cabined in 
ways that are potentially bad for data privacy law—so that if you name 
a particular type of speech (such as personal information) even if 
you’re not really targeting the content or viewpoint, you might risk 
falling under strict scrutiny.61 
 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion) (recognizing 
constitutionality of a content-based restrictions on “a few historic categories of speech” and that 
there may exist “some [other] categories of speech that have been historically unprotected,” but 
declining to recognize a new category in the form of false statements); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (rejecting any new categories of unprotected speech “without 
persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) 
tradition of proscription”); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (declining to 
find “depictions of animal cruelty” as outside First Amendment protection and rejecting “a 
freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
Amendment”). 
 59. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015). 
 60. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 61. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 171. But see Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s 
Reach: Content Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
24 COMMC’N. L. & POL’Y 191 (2019) (demonstrating that many lower courts have been 
interpreting Reed narrowly). 
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Okay. Some really quick but important caveats and then I’ll try to 
let us get to discussion. The first is, I think that there is no current 
Supreme Court level law that clearly makes the CCPA 
unconstitutional. I think there is nothing at the Supreme Court level 
that clearly establishes the appropriate level of scrutiny for the CCPA.  
The Supreme Court has pretty consistently assessed the privacy/First 
Amendment interface on a sui generis, case-by-case basis. 
You see dicta repeated in many of these cases saying, in essence, 
“We are not going to hold that regulators cannot regulate to protect 
private information.”62 The Supreme Court has also repeatedly 
suggested at least that there is a distinction between matters of public 
concern for which there may be more First Amendment protection and 
truly private matters for which there’s less First Amendment 
protection, even though they say the opposite in almost every other 
area of First Amendment doctrine.63 
Last, there is a sort of invisible history of tolerance between the 
First Amendment and privacy laws. There have been privacy laws in 
the US dating back to the ’70s that contained many similar elements 
to the CCPA and none of them have triggered First Amendment 
scrutiny nor have any of them triggered court rulings as 
unconstitutional. 
In conclusion, I want to get to what I think might happen. We 
have recently been seeing litigation in a number of states’ supreme 
courts over revenge porn laws.64 How many people here know what 
revenge porn is? Nonconsensual distribution of sexual images that one 
person has sent to another person under an expectation of privacy.65  
 
 62. See, e.g., Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 574 (“This is not to say that all privacy measures must avoid 
content-based rules.”); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (“We continue to believe that 
the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and 
privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate 
context of the instant case.”); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (“Rather than 
address the broader question whether . . . the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy 
free from unwanted publicity in the press, it is appropriate to focus on the narrower interface 
between press and privacy that this case presents . . . .”). 
 63. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011). 
 64. See, e.g., People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439 (Ill. 2019) (upholding Illinois’ revenge porn 
law against a First Amendment challenge); State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791 (Vt. 2019) (upholding 
Vermont’s revenge porn law against a First Amendment challenge). 
 65. “Revenge porn” is “a popular label describing a subset of nonconsensual pornography 
published for vengeful purposes.” VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 794. The phrase includes “images 
originally obtained without consent . . . as well as images originally obtained with consent, usually 
within the context of a private or confidential relationship.” Id. at 794–95. See generally Danielle 
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Some of the concerns we have been raising here are true of revenge 
porn laws in addition to the CCPA. One state supreme court, the 
Vermont State Supreme Court, has effectively said, “we refuse to 
create a new category of information to which the First Amendment 
does not apply,”66 and instead they applied strict scrutiny and held that 
the law was valid.67 This never, or rarely, happens; remember, strict 
scrutiny is known to be fatal in fact. For First Amendment doctrine, 
the outcome was shocking; they turned strict scrutiny into a balancing 
test instead of treating it as fatal in fact. 
Another approach—taken by the Illinois Supreme Court—was to 
apply intermediate scrutiny to a revenge porn law. That court 
effectively said, “really, the appropriate test for these kinds of things 
is to balance First Amendment concerns against the strength of the 
privacy interest here.” The law again withstood the challenge.68 
My punchline is that this is very complicated. There’s no question 
in my mind the challenges are coming. There is no controlling 
Supreme Court case that would give us an outcome, let alone an actual 
level of scrutiny, but the judges are creative and norms are changing 
and have some faith, they will adapt the doctrine. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Thank you. I am going to take the moderator’s 
prerogative to prompt some discussion, but then we will eventually 
open it up for some questions. I guess I want to ask all of you—starting 
with Professor Kaminski—for the cat-out-of-the-bag problem, do you 
think that line of cases can be constrained by using the issue of public 
concern and/or the state’s interest being of the highest order to say, 
“We’re going to uphold the privacy law in these spaces?” 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yeah. I didn’t talk about how this applied to 
CCPA because of time constraints, but the CCPA, as Professor Wu 
noted, has this incredibly broad definition of personally identifiable 
information69 and then has a “does not include publicly disclosed 
 
Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 
(2014). 
 66. VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 801–02 (“[W]e decline to identify a new categorical exclusion 
from the full protections of the First Amendment when the Supreme Court has not yet addressed 
the question.”). 
 67. Id. at 800 (“[W]e conclude that the Vermont statute survives strict scrutiny as the U.S. 
Supreme Court has applied that standard.”). 
 68. Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 466–72. 
 69. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (Deering 2020). 
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information” exception.70 But the definition of publicly disclosed 
information in the CCPA refers only to government records.71 That 
almost—well, I don’t want to say dooms it. This seems intended to 
address concerns about the cat-out-of-the-bag cases, but there’s still a 
chance that a court looks at this and says, “Well, this doctrine applies 
because the information was lawfully obtained. It’s not just about 
information being released in a public record and this doctrine applies 
more broadly than the exception the CCPA allows.” 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Gentlemen, what would you add to that? 
FELIX WU: I think the question of the constitutionality of the 
CCPA is an easy case, much easier actually than revenge porn laws 
and here’s why: because the CCPA addresses purely commercial 
activities. What do I mean by that? The transactions that Professor 
Kaminski is describing here are potential sales of information. It’s the 
sale of information from one commercial entity to another; that makes 
it completely different from all of the previous Supreme Court cases, 
which involved the dissemination from a commercial entity but to a 
non-commercial consumer or other individual who themselves might 
have a kind of personal right to the information. 
As far as I’m concerned, when two commercial entities are 
transacting in the data on a purely commercial basis, the First 
Amendment simply doesn’t apply.72 We should not, in fact, apply any 
level of scrutiny to that transaction whatsoever, unless you can show 
there’s going to be some downstream effect on an eventual non-
commercial user. Now, you might say, what about Citizens United73 
and other cases like that? Yes, but every one of those cases involved 
an actual person, at least as the recipient of the information. 
If you have two commercial entities who are transacting amongst 
themselves on a commercial basis, as far as I’m concerned, the First 
Amendment has nothing to do with it.  I’m not that optimistic, frankly, 
about this current Supreme Court necessarily going the way that I’m 
describing. On the other hand, for the reasons that Professor Kaminski 
 
 70. Id. § 1798.140(o)(2) (“‘Personal information’ does not include publicly available 
information.”). 
 71. Id. (“‘[P]ublicly available’ means information that is lawfully made available from federal, 
state, or local government records.”). 
 72. Felix T. Wu, The Commercial Difference, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2005, 2048 (2017); 
Felix T. Wu, The Constitutionality of Consumer Privacy Regulation, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 69, 
72–73. 
 73. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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described, at least everything I’m saying is perfectly consistent with 
all the previous case law. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Your position is that company to company data 
transfer isn’t speech at all? 
FELIX WU: I have a complicated view on the particular way you 
framed your question, but let’s put it this way: it’s not, in fact, 
something that should be subject to scrutiny under the First 
Amendment, not even intermediate scrutiny. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: All right.  Mr. Snow, anything to add? 
JAKE SNOW: Nothing there. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Okay. Let me move to another question.  
Professor Wu, you said that in prior precedent—at least under federal 
privacy law—the measure of reasonably capable of being associated 
with a particular individual has been reasonably capable of being 
associated with a particular individual from a stranger’s perspective. 
But the problem is that people are holding vast quantities of data that 
make some information reasonably capable of being associated with a 
particular individual when one has that information in context. 
What’s the right test a court should use when they are trying to 
interpret this “reasonably associated with” phrase? Should it be 
reasonably capable of being associated with a particular person by the 
recipient of the data? Or reasonably capable of being associated with 
a particular person in the context of all the data held by the seller?  
How would you frame it? 
FELIX WU: Let me just start by saying, I do not think there is an 
all-purpose answer to the question of how you should frame almost 
any issue regarding personal information. Ultimately, the question is, 
what does the law aim to do and how do you implement that in the 
definition of personal information. To the extent that we think the 
CCPA is really designed to address the creation and use of the kinds 
of profiles I described earlier, then absolutely, it should be from the 
perspective of the holder of the data or the recipient of the data. And 
to the extent information is identifiable from the perspective of those 
entities that should suffice with respect to making it “personal 
information” under the law. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Let me press you a little bit more. Let’s say I 
have a dataset that means nothing to me, but I know if I sell it to you, 
you will be able to associate a bunch of data points with 10,000 
individuals. 
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FELIX WU: It’s personal information. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Then it becomes personal information for the 
purpose of that transaction? 
FELIX WU: Yes. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Okay. Professor Kaminski and Mr. Snow, agree 
or disagree? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: I think that’s absolutely right. One of the 
things I didn’t get to talk about before is the expanding notions of data 
privacy harm at the Supreme Court level. There’s an increasing 
understanding at the Supreme Court—which also makes me slightly 
optimistic should any First Amendment issue go up to them—that 
data, as Mr. Snow was saying, are something that’s more than just the 
individual pieces of information you have and you can take almost any 
individual data point and given enough related data points about the 
same person, re-identify the person. 
JAKE SNOW: Yeah, I agree. I think that those kinds of data sets are 
personal information because of the real difficulty in protecting people 
from re-identification. It may be difficult, but it’s very difficult for it 
to be impossible. I recommend the article Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization by Paul Ohm74 which goes through a lot of these 
issues. It gives a lot of concrete examples and explains why 
information that doesn’t have explicitly identifying information is 
quite easy to re-identify. 
There are technical ways of protecting individuals from that kind 
of re-identification. Things like differential privacy75 have real 
promise to allow access to datasets without revealing any information 
about an individual in the dataset and there are operations on encrypted 
data using techniques like homomorphic encryption. I do think that 
with technical progress and more innovation in the technical space, 
more will be possible while making really strong privacy guarantees 
to people who are present in the datasets. 
 
 74. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); see also Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data 
Sets, supra note 11, at 1127–29 (reasoning that if “de-identification” is understood to mean 
absolutely no leakage of information about individuals, then it is trivially true to say that data cannot 
be usefully de-identified, but that for other reasonable understandings of “de-identification,” de-
identification may be possible). 
 75. See Alexandra Wood et al., Differential Privacy: A Primer for a Non-Technical Audience, 
21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 211–13 (2018); CYNTHIA DWORK & AARON ROTH, THE 
ALGORITHMIC FOUNDATIONS OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY 5–6 (2014). 
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JUSTIN HUGHES: Let me ask one last moderator’s prerogative 
question. Jake, you were describing how ACLU prefers to have an opt-
in system, but you were somewhat hopeful about how the regs are 
developing. Let me ask you this, will we see an app we can install in 
our phone or our laptop that simply acts as our agent and opts out of 
everywhere? I’m asking you partly as a question of agency law. In 
other words, do the likely regulations permit a future in which we will 
have an AI assistant to which we will say, “Get me out of here,” and 
the AI assistant will opt us out of the sale at five bazillion websites? 
JAKE SNOW: Yeah, I think that’s entirely possible. The law has a 
provision for an agent exercising rights on behalf of a consumer and 
then there’s also the browser flag issue that I talked about. I think both 
of those hold promise for making opting-out a lot easier. I do think, 
however, that opt-out is still problematic because people generally 
won’t turn on the browser flag or install the app. 
Some people who are concerned about privacy may do it but, if 
you look at the research, very few people actually change settings. If 
privacy is the default, the privacy is preserved without a person having 
to do anything. That’s why an opt-in framework is still necessary 
despite the fact that we may have ways to help people who want to 
submit a whole bunch of opt-outs at once. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Margot and Felix, are you two more optimistic 
about that? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: I’m going to have a broader rant for a second 
which is that, individual rights often don’t work—especially if there’s 
no private right of action. If the CCPA came with a private right of 
action, you’d have a ton of class action attorneys ensuring that 
companies are complying. You don’t. Individuals, who have a lot of 
things that they do with their time and have a limited amount of time 
to deal with the handling of their own rights, largely are not going to 
use things like an opt-out provision or an access provision. 
That is just the pessimistic truth. One of my great frustrations with 
this law—and I think also the other panelists probably share it—is that 
it has very few backstops to protect consumers who don’t invoke their 
own rights. In contrast, the General Data Protection Regulation and 
other data privacy laws around the world put substantive requirements 
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on what companies must do with information.76 The CCPA doesn’t do 
that. It relies on you to go and do things to protect yourselves, so good 
luck. 
FELIX WU: I’m largely in agreement. I’m not sure if this is an even 
broader rant or not, but, again, at some level these are important issues 
that even an opt-in system is not going to address entirely. Whether 
you think of it as opt-in or opt-out, you are thinking about it as entirely 
an individual decision—and individual decision-making, particularly 
on a granular level, is, I think, ultimately going to be a difficult way 
of making progress on this. 
 Let me put in a brief defense of this notion that we don’t want to 
just go by individual choice here—because some of you might be 
thinking, “Well, of course, we should go by individual choices. This 
is all just about individual rights and, therefore, choice is what really 
matters and it’s all about identifying who chooses privacy and who 
doesn’t choose privacy.” But part of the idea here is that privacy is not 
just about you; that your privacy is not just about you. Ultimately, 
privacy is also a social value and the ways in which we jointly produce 
privacy and have privacy as a community makes a difference to the 
kind of society we have. That’s a joint and collective issue that cannot 
just be devolved to an aggregation of individual choices made by 
individual people. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: I think that was broader, but beautiful—and not 
a rant. I have many more questions for our panelists, but I would like 
to open it up a little bit to questions from the floor if there are 
questions. You should state the question as loudly as you can and then 
we will repeat it to make sure it gets in the transcription. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Sure. Since we’re talking about the opt-out 
framework, I’d imagine that very few people would actually opt-in to 
sell their data and get no monetary kickback from that, just for using 
a service such as Google or Facebook. That seems like a big concern 
because advertising revenue funds a lot of other services, like news 
publications. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Your question is, will the opt-out framework, if 
utilized by many people, cause a diminution of advertising revenue?  
 
 76. GDPR, supra note 2, art. 12 (description of substantive requirement of what companies 
must do). In Canada, companies are required to act in compliance with ten enumerated principles 
pertaining to data privacy. See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 
2000, c 5 (Can.). 
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To me, your question seems to be about the effects of all this on the 
digital economy, is that right? 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Yeah. I imagine the opt-out framework may 
have a pretty massive impact on the digital economy. In fact, I just 
want to hear more of your thoughts on that. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Okay. 
FELIX WU: Let me start by noting that it is a common assumption 
that the data websites collect on people is the driver of the advertising, 
but that is not necessarily the case—or at least it is a contested factual 
question as to how much of the value of the advertising actually 
depends on having these data versus how much of the advertising 
dollars would still get spent regardless and therefore support the web 
services even in the absence of the use of that private data. There are 
some studies77 that report that the gap in value between targeted and 
contextual advertising is far smaller than is generally assumed 
(“contextual” meaning relative to whatever the user is looking at78 
rather than more targeted advertising based on the user’s past 
history79). 
If that’s the case, that will mean that we still have lots of 
advertising dollars; we will still have lots of advertising supported web 
services. It’s true, we may have a little less, but not in a way that 
necessarily is as catastrophic as some people might think. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: I should add that the CCPA has very extensive 
provisions—that our panelists might want to comment on—providing 
that a person who opts out must be provided equal services, but 
eventually can be charged a differential based on the value of the data 
that they are withholding from being sold. I’ve seen some very low 
estimates about that—$0.06 per person or $0.12 per person—but that 
is something that the Attorney General’s regulations are intended to 
address also. Do you have comments about that concern? I think, 
Margot, you might have had some comments on that. 
 
 77. See Charlotte Otremba, How Contextual Targeting Puts Privacy First While Closing the 
Engagement Gap, BIDTELLECT (Feb. 2020), https://bidtellect.com/2020/02/how-contextual-
targeting-puts-privacy-first-while-closing-the-engagement-gap/. 
 78. Ana Gotter, Contextual Advertising: What It Is and Why It Matters, DISRUPTIVE ADVERT. 
(Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.disruptiveadvertising.com/ppc/contextual-advertising/. 
 79. The Power of Targeted Ads, IDG ADVERT.: BLOG, https://idgadvertising.com/the-power-
of-targeted-ads/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2020); see also Hiltzik, supra note 36 (concluding that 
“[t]argeted advertising is a major source of pollution of the online experience” and that polls 
showing that Americans like targeted advertising “generally are sponsored by the advertising 
industry”). 
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MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yeah. We were talking about this earlier and 
I think that we have differing views on this—more optimistic versus 
more pessimistic. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Let’s hear them. 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yeah. I’m excited about the charge-me-
money-if-you’re-going-to-give-me-my-privacy option not because I 
believe that your information is your property, to be really clear, but 
more because I think that identifying the economic value of personal 
information is a good idea. I think it is a good idea because it starts to 
make visible the data economy in a way that is necessary for other 
kinds of law. There’s been, for example, a longstanding conflict over 
what counts as privacy harm. I think there is one court case where the 
court says that the “Mount Kilimanjaro” of privacy cases is standing, 
in other words convincingly saying “I was actually injured.”80 
Well, if you have a whole bunch of companies who are saying, 
“Give up your privacy or pay us this amount of money,” you’re forcing 
companies to start to actually place dollar amounts on your privacy 
and that thinking can be transferable to other parts of laws. That’s my 
sneakily optimistic version of this. 
Plus one to what Professor Wu just said about contextual 
advertising versus targeted advertising—this is not science as much as 
companies pretend it is. We don’t actually know if targeted advertising 
works better. 
The one thing I’d say on the impact on the digital economy—we 
haven’t talked about this yet—but the bigger concern here, I think, is 
actually competition. As much as I’d like to go after the data brokers, 
the law is really going after the data brokers and not after the big 
platforms. In some ways, Facebook and Google and the other primary 
platforms might actually make out better, because we may be killing 
the third-party advertising industry. If the platforms stop working with 
third parties who now face higher regulatory costs and just internalize 
behavioral advertising by doing it all themselves, then the monopoly 
or anti-competitive concerns will go way up. That, I don’t think, is an 
intended consequence of the legislation. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Mr. Snow? 
 
 80. In re Google, Inc. Priv. Pol’y Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); see also Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 439, 449–50 (2017) (discussing the Google Privacy Policy case). 
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JAKE SNOW: I do think that a path forward for allowing ad-
supported businesses is what Professor Kaminski and Professor Wu 
have mentioned which is that, if somebody exercises their opt-out 
rights, they will get contextual ads. If they don’t opt out, then they 
would get more personalized, targeted ads. Contextual ads have been 
the way that advertising-supported businesses have worked for a long 
time—television and newspapers were all supported by contextual 
ads. There’s no reason why that model can’t still work. 
With respect to the notion of discrimination or requiring that 
people pay more for their privacy rights under the CCPA, I think that’s 
the wrong path to go down. One reason is that it inherently creates a 
barrier to privacy for people who don’t have the means to pay for the 
right to have—for the privilege of having—privacy. Privacy shouldn’t 
be a luxury good. It is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.81  
It is an inalienable right under the California Constitution.82 Those 
rights are not something that should be bought and sold and they’re 
not something people should be required to pay for. 
I do think that it’s important to recognize that the value of 
people’s information is not just related to how much money they have.  
Being rich doesn’t necessarily make people’s information more 
valuable. In fact, people’s information is valuable not when they are 
rich, but when they are vulnerable. If you look at the ranking of the 
most valuable adwords on Google, the top one is mesothelioma lawyer 
and if you look down the 100 Top Adwords, you see property damage, 
personal injury, addiction, car accidents.83 
These are people who are looking to the internet in a time of 
desperation and they need help. They are not wealthy. They are going 
to the internet to find help with a desperate need, and that is the 
information that’s most valuable to an advertising platform, the urgent 
needs of people who are struggling. That’s another reason why we 
shouldn’t be charging people more for the privilege of having their 
 
 81. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 44, art. 12 (“No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference 
or attacks.”). 
 82. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have 
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, 
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”). 
 83. Chris Lake, The Most Expensive 100 Google Adwords Keywords in the US, SEARCH 
ENGINE WATCH (May 31, 2016), https://www.searchenginewatch.com/2016/05/31/the-most-
expensive-100-google-adwords-keywords-in-the-us/. 
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information protected. We’ll further disproportionately harm the most 
vulnerable among us. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Another question? Yes, ma’am—in front. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Yes. You mentioned that the CCPA does 
not apply to certain businesses. And also how will this law affect law 
firms? To what extent do they have to meet the CCPA standards? 
JUSTIN HUGHES: The question is a practical one. Does CCPA 
apply to law firms and also very quickly, what are the thresholds for 
the law’s application? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: I don’t have the thresholds memorized. It 
depends on how big you are and how many California residents’ 
personal information you are processing.84 There are three categories.  
Some of them are more oriented towards business size—depending on 
revenue—and others are more oriented towards sheer number of 
processing. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Jake, do you have the numbers memorized? 
JAKE SNOW: No, but I have a computer. 
FELIX WU: I have the full numbers here. There’s annual gross 
revenue in excess of $25 million or the personal information of 50,000 
or more consumers, households, or devices or derives 50 percent of its 
annual revenues from selling personal information.85 Now, of those 
three, $25 million is quite a lot, but the information of 50,000 
consumers is a very easy threshold to reach. Why? Because of the 
broad definition of personal information. Every time you track an 
individual on your website, that is another person’s personal 
information that you now have. You track 50,000 people on your 
website—50,000 Californians just to be clear because that’s who’s 
defined as a consumer under the law—you track 50,000 Californians 
on your website and you will trigger the law. 
JAKE SNOW: That’s something like 137 per day, and so you don’t 
need very much tracking to get there. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Another question? Yes, ma’am—in the middle. 
 
 84. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1) (Deering 2020). 
 85. Id. (A business must satisfy “one or more of the following thresholds: (A) Has annual 
gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000), as adjusted pursuant 
to paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 1798.185. (B) Alone or in combination, annually 
buys, receives for the business’s commercial purposes, sells, or shares for commercial purposes, 
alone or in combination, the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, households, or 
devices. (C) Derives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal 
information”). 
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AUDIENCE QUESTION: I have a question. Can you tell me about any 
provisions on appropriate safeguards to protect against data breaches?  
I was wondering if you could speak a little on that. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: The question is whether the CCPA includes any 
data security requirements on those holding personal information. 
JAKE SNOW: The one place where there is a private right of action 
in the CCPA is for data breach. I will say that the elements of a data 
breach claim are pretty narrow under the CCPA, so it is not going to 
apply any time you have a breach; it requires an exfiltration, theft, or 
disclosure that is unauthorized and a result of a failure to maintain 
reasonable security practices with respect to a different definition of 
personal information than applies to the rest of the statute.86 
That different definition is what we would normally think of as 
highly sensitive personal information—names, email addresses 
associated with social security numbers, other ID numbers, 
biometrics, things like that. All that means that the data breach cause 
of action which is available is fairly narrow and the definition of 
personal information is much narrower there as well. As a result, 
there’s a more limited litigation risk for companies, but there is some. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: So biometric information is definitely is personal 
information under the CCPA? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yeah, it’s on the list. 
FELIX WU: It explicitly says so. 
JAKE SNOW: It’s in the primary definition list of CCPA87  and it’s 
also in the list in the definition for the data breach.88 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: I will just say by way of background that the 
data security provisions of the CCPA have been attracting a lot of 
attention in part because that’s where the class action attorneys are 
going to have fun, but California has had a data breach law since 2003.  
 
 86. Id. § 1798.150(a)(1) (“(a)(1) Any consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted 
personal information, as defined in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 
1798.81.5, is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of 
the business’s violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and 
practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the personal information may 
institute a civil action for any of the following: (A) To recover damages in an amount not less than 
one hundred dollars ($100) and not greater than seven hundred and fifty ($750) per consumer per 
incident or actual damages, whichever is greater. (B) Injunctive or declaratory relief. (C) Any other 
relief the court deems proper.”). 
 87. Id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(E) (definition of personal information includes biometric 
information). 
 88. See id. § 1798.150(a)(1) (including biometric data under personal information, “as defined 
in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 1798.81.5”). 
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This is actually one place where we’ve seen the most ratcheting up of 
state-by-state legislation in the last couple of years. States have gone 
from having in place laws where a company has to inform consumers 
that their data have been breached to laws with actual substantive 
requirements of what a company has to do in order to protect data.  
States are moving from transparency obligations to what I was talking 
about earlier: substantive obligations for the company. 
One of the big focuses in these sorts of provisions is what the heck 
does “reasonable” security practices mean, but I will leave that to 
Professor Wu to start to spell that out. [Laughter] 
FELIX WU: Oh, I’m not sure that I can exactly spell that out. The 
one point I want to make with respect to biometrics though is that even 
though biometric information is in the definition of personal 
information in the CCPA, the coverage of biometrics in California is 
far short of what it is, for example, in Illinois, because in Illinois you 
need prior written consent in order to collect biometrics,89 whereas 
under the California law, you’re given the same rights as all the rest of 
the things that count as personal information and there is no 
requirement of prior written consent for the collection of personal 
information generally under the CCPA. In that sense, the coverage of 
biometrics currently in the California law is short of what it is in 
Illinois, which is currently the leading source of biometrics protection. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Professor Wu is thinking of a class action against 
Facebook under the Illinois law that was filed under diversity 
jurisdiction in federal court in Northern California. And for which the 
Ninth Circuit recently upheld for class certification, correct? 
FELIX WU: Right. In which Facebook recently settled for $500 
million.90 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Ouch. Okay. I would like to go just until 7:20 
PM. Any other questions from the audience? Yes, sir. 
 
 89. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2020). 
 90. Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Facebook to Pay $550 Million to Settle Facial Recognition 
Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/technology/facebook-
privacy-lawsuit-earnings.html. Although Facebook agreed to settle this lawsuit for $550 million, 
the court rejected the settlement and only later approved a revised settlement in which Facebook is 
to pay $650 million to settle the class action. Siladitya Ray, Facebook Gets Preliminary Approval 
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AUDIENCE QUESTION:  Continuing with the biometric data we were 
just talking about, there is a recent article that came out about a 
company in Silicon Valley called Clearview.91 They’re using a facial 
recognition app that now they released to several law enforcement 
agencies. The way that they developed the app is that they scraped 
Facebook—basically every single website that posts images—and so 
the app is 99% accurate. Given that they would clearly fall over the 
50,000 persons threshold, Clearview would be subject to the CCPA.  
If I submit a deletion request to that company, do you think that the 
deletion would also apply to data held under law enforcement agency 
control or are they exempt? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: I’m going to let Jake answer this but I want to 
point out that Clearview’s 99% accuracy claim92 is based in part on 
policy trolling that Jake did to Congress. Watching this back and forth 
has been amazing. 
JAKE SNOW: Don’t believe their accuracy claims. For background, 
in 2018, as part of the work that we did at the ACLU surrounding facial 
recognition, we took 25,000 public mugshots, loaded them into 
Amazon Rekognition93 and then searched in that database for every 
current member of Congress—all 535 members of Congress. We 
found that twenty-eight members of Congress in 2018 falsely matched 
with mugshots. Those twenty-eight false positives were 
disproportionately people of color; six members of the Congressional 
black caucus falsely matched. As a result of that, members of Congress 
sent letters to Amazon saying there’s a real civil-rights concern with 
bias and accuracy with your surveillance tool,94 i.e., what the hell is 
going on? 
 
 91. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-
recognition.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2020). Clearview AI is headquartered in New York. 
 92. Donie O’Sullivan, This Man Says He’s Stockpiling Billions of Our Photos, CNN (Feb. 10, 
2020, 9:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/10/tech/clearview-ai-ceo-hoan-ton-
that/index.html. 
 93. What Is Amazon Rekognition?, AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ 
rekognition/latest/dg/what-is.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). The controversy surrounding this 
technology has prompted Amazon to suspend its marketing to law enforcement. Sam Dean, Amazon 
Pauses Police Use of Its Facial Recognition Software, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2020, 4:59 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-06-10/amazon-police-facial-
recognition-software-rekognition. 
 94. Davey Alba, Bipartisan Lawmakers Want to Talk to Amazon About Its Facial Recognition 
Tech, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 26, 2018, 1:37 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveya
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Clearview said they used the ACLU’s methodology, which they 
did not. What Clearview did is they took their tool, which has the 
images from the sources you identified, and then they searched in that 
tool for members of Congress. All members of Congress were in their 
database because they have public photos on the internet and their 
software apparently correctly identified them. To me, that is not a valid 
test of the accuracy of their tool and says nothing about whether it is 
accurate in real-world conditions. Nor is it similar at all to our work 
except that they used members of Congress. 
Imitation is the most sincere form of flattery, but this is flattery 
that I can do without. If they want the ACLU’s stamp of approval, they 
should shut it all down and turn off their servers and get out of the 
surveillance business. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Yes, every member of Congress has a well-
constructed, well-lit photo but the question was, if you send a request 
to Clearview and say delete my biometrics and Clearview behaves, 
what happens to the datasets held by the law enforcement agencies? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Just an important caveat, deletion applies to 
businesses with whom you have a direct consumer relationship.95  
Clearview is not Facebook. You don’t have an account at Clearview 
by which you’re a consumer. So, my understanding is that you don’t 
have a deletion right. The bigger question is whether you have an 
access right to be able to actually see the information—because that 
does apply to third parties. I’ll leave the law enforcement exception to 
Jake. 
JAKE SNOW: With respect to the deletion right, I agree. The 
statutory language is “collected from consumers,”96 so I think you 
wouldn’t necessarily have that right. With respect to the access rights, 
if you go to the Clearview website, they actually require—at least they 
did a couple of weeks ago—that you send them an image of your 
government ID in an email in order to exercise your access right. I 
 
lba/congressmen-mismatched-to-mugshots-by-amazon-tech-demand (last updated July 27, 2018, 
4:19 PM). The ACLU demonstrated similar results with members of the California legislature. 
Anita Chabria, Facial Recognition Software Mistook 1 in 5 California Lawmakers for Criminals, 
Says ACLU, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/20
19-08-12/facial-recognition-software-mistook-1-in-5-california-lawmakers-for-criminals-says-
aclu. 
 95. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (Deering 2020). 
 96. Id. § 1798.105(a) (“A consumer shall have the right to request that a business delete any 
personal information about the consumer which the business has collected from the consumer.”). 
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don’t know about you but I’m not super excited about sending an 
image of my government ID in an email to a company that’s building 
a massive dystopian surveillance network for law enforcement. 
This speaks to the chilling effects of what Clearview is doing and 
how what they are doing stands in the way of people exercising their 
access rights. With respect to the law enforcement exception, it’s a fair 
question and I don’t know the answer. Clearview has said—or I should 
say suggested— that they are selling to authoritarian regimes overseas 
and also that they have private security contracts potentially as well.  
For those customers, the law-enforcement exception under the CCPA 
would not apply.97 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Let me ask you a quick question. The law 
provides that you can go in twice a year and request your information 
and the law also provides you can request the companies with which 
you have a relationship to delete your information. How often can you 
ask them to delete your information, because I’m wondering if it is 
kind of like cleaning the gutters on a house. Do you have to keep going 
every six months and say, “Delete my information?” Is that the system 
that’s been set up by the CCPA? 
FELIX WU: I think so. 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yeah, I think so. This is why we should not 
rely only on individual rights. Individuals don’t have the time, 
capacity, or often the sophistication to police companies this way. We 
need to put affirmative obligations on companies even if consumers 
don’t invoke their rights. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: So if you really were stringent about wanting 
people not to collect your information, not only would you have to 
visit a hundred websites, but you would have to visit a hundred 
websites every six months. 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: Yeah. I think the interesting question to Jake 
is, if the global opt-out option that’s being considered in regulations 
that you are following in far more detail than I have been, is that 
something that once you flag yourself for global opt-out, would that 
get rid of this regularly-cleaning-the-gutters problem? 
JAKE SNOW: The global opt-out applies to sale and, for that, I think 
the idea is that you would opt out globally and forget it; you wouldn’t 
 
 97. Id. § 1798.145(a)(3) (providing an exception to “[c]ooperate with law enforcement 
agencies concerning conduct or activity that the business, service provider, or third party reasonably 
and in good faith believes may violate federal, state, or local law”). 
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have to do it again—it would not, for example, turn itself off every six 
months and force you to figure out your settings and turn it back on.  
With respect to deletion, there’s nothing in the draft regulations for a 
global ongoing deletion request or something like that. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Let me ask each of our panelists to handle one 
last question. The last question is, concerning the CCPA what is the 
issue that the courts will have to figure out first or the issue that they 
will have to figure out that is most important and how should they 
figure it out? I think Professor Wu has to start. 
FELIX WU: I think the first thing that’s going to arise is the 
question of “sale.” I think the scope of what counts as a sale is 
probably going to be the most pressing issue, because transactions for 
valuable consideration is a really broad idea and could cover lots of 
possible activities. Since that’s the one thing that you can specifically 
tell companies not to do, it is the easiest place in the CCPA to detect a 
possible violation—as opposed to you accessing your information or 
something along those lines. What I mean is, you put in a request to 
access your information and how are you going to know when they 
don’t give you some piece of something that’s buried somewhere? 
It will be really hard for you to know if they didn’t give you all 
the information they have, whereas if you tell them not to sell your 
information and then they still engage in some sort of transaction 
which they say is not a sale, we are more likely to become aware of 
that. So, I think that’s the thing that’s going to come up first. As for 
how you resolve it, it will depend on exactly how it comes up, but I 
think that Jake is right that the statute is written very broadly. Any 
transaction for value will do and, accordingly, I think courts should 
interpret the provision broadly. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: You think the question of what things count as 
valuable consideration under the statute will have to be litigated first? 
FELIX WU: Correct. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Okay. Professor Kaminski? 
MARGOT KAMINSKI: They call it the First Amendment for a reason.  
The challenges are coming and in short, my view is 95 percent of the 
CCPA is constitutional. 
FELIX WU: You’re not saying which 5 percent is unconstitutional? 
JAKE SNOW: I agree that it’s the First Amendment and I think 
Dormant Commerce Clause for good measure. And just to add to 
Professor Kaminski’s comments, the Attorney General’s office lacks 
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the resources to actually do comprehensive enforcement. You have 
like ten or fifteen attorneys and they are trying to stand up an 
enforcement program for all of California. 
I think that the AG’s office will start by finding companies who 
are effectively scofflaws, who have done essentially nothing to 
comply. They don’t have the links on the website. They’re not 
responding to access requests. They’re blowing deadlines. I think 
there are going to be some companies who do that, who decided to 
take their chances with an under-resourced Attorney General’s office.  
If somebody makes that choice, then I think the Attorney General 
might make an example of them. Those scofflaws—and I would say 
this as somebody who litigated cases against scofflaws for the Federal 
Trade Commission—love the First Amendment argument. So I think 
they’ll bring it up. Basically, the First Amendment will come up in a 
case against an entity that may have few other valid defenses. 
JUSTIN HUGHES: Your answer was both constitutional but it was 
also political—that is, the Attorney General’s office wants to show 
enforcement, so they will go after the low hanging fruit, and take them 
out. All right. With that, I’d like to thank our panelists. Please, let’s 
thank our panelists. I think they’ll stay around a bit and answer 
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